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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

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Report of Special Meeting, 15 September 1950

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
18 September 1950

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1. A special meeting of the Committee was convened at 1700 hours, 15 September 1950, to consider a report from COMNAVFE that a military convoy was sighted on 15 September moving between Antung, Manchuria and Chongju, Korea. The report stated that approximately 50 vehicles were sighted on the road east and west of Namsidong; that approximately 20 tanks in the convoy were moving rapidly southward; and that the road for an estimated 50 to 75 miles was covered with many vehicles, some parked along the roadside in the Namsidong area.

2. The G-2 representatives stated that FEC had already been queried about this report on the morning telecon of 15 September and that FEC had replied that a subsequent Air Force reconnaissance had found only one vehicle in this area.

3. It was agreed that there was insufficient information to evaluate the significance of the reported movement; that it might represent a continuing movement of supply columns from Manchuria to the North Korean forces or that it was remotely possible that it was a Chinese Communist movement into Korea; and that further information was needed to reach any definite conclusion. A request for additional comment was dispatched to FEC.

4. On the telecon of 17 September 1950, FEC replied that no further details were available and that the convoy was reported to have consisted of approximately 100 vehicles of which 30 were tanks. G-2, FEC further commented as follows:

"It is believed that reconnaissance report of single sighting one convoy does not readily lend itself to the formation of definite conclusions as to significance. It could be possibly a sighting error.

"This report of movement, however, when combined with the reports of the last few weeks of generally increased traffic in this area leads to the conclusion that it presents a combination of primarily supply movements, assembly and transport into Korea of military personnel of Korean ethnic origin released in Manchuria as well as normal traffic incident to the maintenance of defensive works and installations along the Chinese-Korean border in the Yalu area.

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"The possibility of increased Chinese and Soviet aid, in personnel and supplies, is not entirely excluded though no specific proof can be presented at this time."

John Weckerling

JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee

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